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INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACHINE COMPANY, INC. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jursidiction over this case under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2-(3) (j) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Mr. Arguello's claim "arise from" Industrial 
Woodworking Machine Company, Inc.'s ("IWM Co.") conduct toward 
Utah as required by Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-24 (1987)? Pre-trial jurisdictional decisions based on 
documentary evidence are reviewed de novo by appellate courts. 
Anderson v. Am. Soc. of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 8 07 
P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that defendant 
and appellee, IWM Co., did not have the necessary minimum 
contacts with Utah to allow Utah courts to acquire personal 
jursidiction over IWM Co.? Pre-trial jursidiction decisions 
based on documentery evidence are reviewed de novo by appellate 
courts. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24. 
Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submitting 
person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent does any 
of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state as to any claim arising from: 
. . . 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty... 
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from an 
order of the lower court (R.74) dismissing Mr. Arguello's 
complaint based on IWM Co.'s lack of sufficient minimum 
contacts with Utah necessary to subject IWM Co. to the 
personal jurisdiction of this forum. 
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B. Disposition of the Case Below, Mr. Arguello 
commenced this action by filing a complaint against IWM Co. 
seeking damages for personal injuries. (R.l). IWM Co. then 
filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on this 
forum's lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.44). Both parties 
submitted memoranda in support of their positions regarding IWM 
Co.'s motion. Judge David E. Roth thereafter granted IWM Co.'s 
motion to dismiss. (R.74). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Arguello brought this action against IWM Co. based 
on personal injuries that allegedly occurred when he operated a 
used finger jointing machine that originally had been 
manufactured by IWM Co. The plaintiff's alleged injuries 
occurred in July of 1987 while he was working for 
Weathershield, Inc., of Logan Utah. The finger jointing 
machine, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-4-10771 (hereinafter simply "the 
machine") originally had been built for and sold to Pickering 
Lumber Co. ("Pickering") located in Standard, California in 
1971. (Affidavit of Gale Y. Cromeens, fllO, R.18-20). The 
invoice of the sale to Pickering (attached to Cromeens' 
affidavit as Exhibit "A", R.21-23) shows that the machine 
contained numerous additions and appears to have been custom 
made to Pickering's specifications. The cost of the machine in 
1971 was $81,473.50. (R.23). In addition, the invoice reveals 
that Pickering was charged $4,073.68 in state sales tax, 
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another indication that Pickering was the intended end user. 
(R.23). 
In July of 1982, Weathershield contact IWM Co. and 
requested that IWM Co. send a service representative to examine 
certain machinery in Utah that Weathershield somehow had 
acquired. (Cromeens affidavit at flO, R.18-20). This was the 
only occasion during the last nine years when IWM Co. has sent 
a service representative to Utah. (Cromeens affidavit, flO, R. 
20) . 
The service representative found that the machine had 
been substantially modified during the ten-year period since it 
had left IWM Co.'s possession . (R.19). Specifically, the lug 
system had been modified causing the wood to pop out. (R.19). 
The service representative advised Weathershield that the 
modifications needed to be corrected before the machine would 
work properly. (R.19). Most importantly, the service 
representative did not perform any service or work on the 
machine. (R.19). He merely responded to Weathershield7s 
inquiry comcerning the operation of the machine. (Cromeens 
affidavit, f10, R. 18-19). There is no evidence that the 
service representative was requested by Weathershield to 
perform repairs or otherwise work on the machine. 
IWM Co.'s contacts with Utah are few, insubstantial 
and totally unrelatd to plaintiff's claimed injuries. IWM Co. 
maintains no office in Utah. (R.17). IWM Co. has never 
employed personnel in Utah. (Cromeens affidavit fl5, R.17). 
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IWM Co. sends no sales personnel to Utah to market its 
products. (R.17). The only advertising done by IWM Co. which 
may or may not have reached Utah has consisted of occasional 
small advertisements placed in four national trade 
publications. (R.17-18). None of these advertisements dealt 
with machinery of the type which allegedly injured the 
plaintiff. (Cromeens affidavit, f6, R.17-18). IWM Co.'s sales 
to Utah during each of the last nine hears have averaged 
$13,153.00, a figure that represents approximately three-tenths 
of one percent (0.3%) of IWM Co.'s total sales volume. 
(Cromeens affidavit, f3, R.17). In contrast, this average 
annual sales figure amounts to less than one-sixth of the sales 
price of the single finger joint machine sold to Pickering 
Lumber in 1971. 
The products sold by IWM Co. to Utah have consisted 
primarily of parts, not equipment, and have resulted from Utah 
customers calling IWM Co. to order its products. (Cromeens 
affidavit, f4, R.17). IWM Co. generally sells directly to the 
user of its products. (R.18). IWM Co. has not attempted to 
market its products in this state or to place its products into 
a distribution newtork or "stream of commerce" designed to 
carry IWM Co.'s products here. (Cromeens affidavit., 57, 
R.18). IWM Co. has no history of utilizing Utah's court system 
or other services. (Cromeens affidavit, f8, R.18). In short, 
IWM Co. possesses few contacts with this state and those 
contacts are totally unrelated to plaintiff's alleged injuries. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
IWM CO. does not have substantial connections with 
Utah. Mr. Arguello, accordingly, has based his jurisdictional 
claim on Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24. 
However, because Mr. Arguello7s claims do not "arise from" IWM 
Co.'s few, minor connections with this state, the long-arm 
statute fails as a basis for Utah's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. 
Similarly, IWM Co. does not possess sufficient minimum 
contacts with Utah such that this forum's assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over IWM Co. would satisfy the due process clause 
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. IWM 
Co. has very few connections with this state and these have 
resulted from Utah residents reaching out to IWM Co. in Texas. 
IWM Co. does not target Utah to sell or distribute its 
products, or otherwise take advangage of the benefits and 
protections of this state. Plaintiff's claims are not related 
to, nor do they arise from, any IWM Co. activity directed 
toward this forum. 
Finally, the machine that injured plaintiff was not 
placed into the "stream of commerce" for ultimate distribution 
to Utah. Nor does IWM Co. utilize a distribution network that 
targets this state. IWM Co. sold the machine for use in 
California and did not participate in or facilitate the 
machine's removal to Utah. Therefore, IWM Co. has insufficient 
minimum contacts with Utah, either direct or indirect, to 
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satisfy the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment and 
the decison of the trial court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The legitimate exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
a nonresident defendant based on Utah's long-arm statute 
requires that two criteria be satisfied. First, the 
defendant's conduct must fall within the ambit of the long-arm 
statute as contained in Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24. Second, the 
defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
such that maintenance of a suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice within the 
constraints of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). 
Neither of these criteria are satisfied in the instant action. 
The only evidence submitted in the proceedings below 
were the affidavit of Gale Y. Cromeens (R.16-20) and the 
exhibits attached thereto (R.21-26) submitted by IWM Co. Mr. 
Arguello did not contest this evidence nor submit any 
countering affidavits, exhibits or other evidence. 
Accordingly, this court's review of the trial court's decision 
is limited to the evidence contained in the Cromeens affidavit 
and its supporting exhibits. See Roskellv & Co. v. Lerco, 
Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980). The affidavit and 
exhibits are attached to this brief as Addendeum 1. 
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I. MR. ARGUELLO'S CLAIM DID NOT "ARISE FROM" 
IWM CO.'S CONDUCT TOWARD THE FORUM AS 
REQUIRED BY UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE. 
The relevant provision of Utah's long-arm statute 
relied upon by Mr. Arguello to assert jurisdiction over IWM Co. 
explicitly provides that the plaintiff's claim must "arise 
from" the defendant's causing of injury within the state. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-24 (3). The Utah Supreme Court explained the 
criteria that must be met to satisfy the "arising from" 
provision of Utah's long-arm statute in Roskelly & Co. v. 
Lerco, Inc.. P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1980) as follows: 
[I]f the action is brought pursuant to the 
long-arm statute because defendant is not doing 
substantial business in the forum state, 
plaintiff must show that his claim arises out of 
some contact defendant has with the forum state, 
some action undertaken by defendant by which it 
can be shown that defendant has in fact 
"purposefully availed himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state" and 
it does not here assist the plaintif to show the 
contacts defendant has with the forum, if the 
specific litigation at bar does not arise out of 
those contacts. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original text). 
This view is consistent with the requirement 
established by the United States Supreme Court that the cause 
of action must "arise out of" the defendant's activities toward 
the forum state to satisfy due process considerations unless 
the defendant has substantial ties to the forum. See Hansen 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 789 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 
1283 (1958). One commentator has summarized this concept as 
follows: "The United Staes Supreme Court has used the arising 
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out of concept to describe siutations where the plaintiff's 
claim came into existence as a result of, and bears a close 
relationship to, the non-resident defendant's foreign-state 
activities." Strachan, In Personum Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 
Utah L. Rev. 235, 253; see Hansen v. Denckla. 357 U.S. at 
251-53, 78 S.Ct. at 1237, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1296-98. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Arguello's claim is totally 
unrelated to any IWM Co. activity directed toward Utah. The 
machine was custom manufactured for use by a California lumber 
company and was not sold for distribution here. (R.18). 
Similarly, the machine was not advertised in Utah or in any 
publications that could reach Utah. (R.17-18). IWM Co.'s few 
small advertisements in national trade magazines involved 
entirely different products. (R.18). IWM Co. was not 
responsible for the machine's entry into Utah and is unaware 
how it came into Weathershield's possession here. (R.19). 
During the service representative's sole visit here nine years 
ago, he merely advised Weathershield to correct modifications 
that had been made to the machine since it had left IWM Co.'s 
control (R.19). He performed no work on the machine, nor is 
there any evidence that he was requested to do so by 
Weathershield. (R.19). 
In short, Mr. Arguello's alleged injuries simply did 
not arise from IWM Co.'s activities in Utah within the meaning 
of the long-arm statute. His injuries did not come into 
existence as a result of, or bear a close relationship to, IWM 
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Co.'s conduct in or toward Utah. Therefore, Mr. Arguello may 
not assert the long-arm statute as a basis for jurisdiction. 
II. IWM CO. DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT MINIMUM 
CONTRACTS TO SUBJECT IT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
IN UTAH. 
A. IWM Do. does not have sufficient direct 
minimum contacts wth Utah to enable this 
forum to assert jurisdiction. 
The due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution requires that a non-resident 
defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
state such that the defendant should "reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there." World-wide Volkswagen v. 
Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 295-298, 100 S. Ct. 559, 556-67 62 
L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The defendant must have "purposefully 
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum state." Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 
659, 662 (Utah 1989) (quoting Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 
253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d. at 1298). The relationship 
of the defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other is 
central to this inquiry. Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching 
Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). Specifically, the cause 
of action should arise out of or have a substantial connection 
with the defendants activity in the forum (as discussed in 
Section I above). In addition, any balancing of the 
convenience of the parties and interests of the state should 
weigh in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction before due 
process concerns are satisfied. See Mallory Engineering v. Ted 
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R. Brown & Assocs., 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1029, 101 S.Ct. 602, 66 L.Ed.2d 492 (1980). 
The application of these due process requirements can 
best be seen by analyzing relevant case law. A case closely 
analogous to the instant action was addressed by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Fidelity & 
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 
440, 447 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 75 U.S. 1082, 106 S. 
Ct. 853 (1986), which required an analysis of Utah personal 
jurisdiction law in a products liability setting. In 
Philadelphia Resins, the manufacturer of synthetic fiber cable 
was sued for injuries sustained when a cable attached to a 
helicopter broke resulting in substantial damage to the 
equipment. The cable had been sold to an Arkansas helicopter 
pilot who ordered it prior to coming to Utah to perform a 
delivery contract. The pilot had read about the cable in a 
national trade publication. The pilot ordered it specifically 
for use in performing the contract in the Rocky Mountan region 
and so informed an employee of the manufacturer. The defendant 
manufacturer had sold its products in all fifty states, 
including Utah, but between 1978 and 1980 the defendant's sales 
to Utah amounted to approximately one tenth of one percent 
(0.1%) of the defendant's gross sales volume. 
In a thorough, carefully reasoned opinion that 
examined the development of the constitutional due process 
requirements of personal jurisdiction, the court held that 
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because it was never specifically foreseeable that the cable 
was destined for the Utah market, the defendant lacked the 
necessary minimum contacts with the forum for Utah to exercise 
personal jurisdiction. The court stated: 
If a defendant's product comes into the forum 
state as a result of deliberate, although perhaps 
indirect, effort of the defendant to serve the 
forum state's market, then that defendant is 
subject to jurisdiction there. Placing one's 
product into the "stream of commerce11 with the 
expectation of distribution into particular areas 
is the classic example of such an indirect 
effort. If, however, the defendant's product 
comes into the forum state as a result of the 
actions of an unconnected third party, or of 
fortuitous events over which the defendant has no 
control, then the defendant is not subject to 
jurisdiction in the forum state. 
Id. at 446. 
Philadelphia Resins provides a similar fact pattern to 
the case at bar concerning the defendant's contacts to the 
forum. In the instant case, IWM Co.'s sales to Utah have 
amounted to approximately three tenths of one percent (0.3%) of 
its gross sales over the last nine years. (R.17). The 
majority of these sales have involved parts and have been 
unrelated to the machinery that allegedly injured the 
plaintiff. (R.17). The few sales that have occurred in Utah 
have been initiated by Utah customers and have not occurred 
through IWM Co.'s efforts to sell its products here. (R.17). 
The machine that allegedly injured the plaintiff was 
originally built for and supplied to a California lumber 
company approximately 16 years prior to the time when the 
plaintiff claims to have been injured. (R.19). The machine 
had not been placed into the stream of commerce for 
distribution or resale here. The machine was modified and came 
to Utah solely through the actions of unconnected third parties 
or fortuitous events over which the defendant had no control. 
Indeed, IWM Co. actually had considerably less 
opportunity to foresee that the product in question would be 
used in Utah than did the defendant in Philadelphia Resins. 
Unlike the cable manufacturer, IWM Co. had not advertised the 
product in question in national trade publications and IWM 
Co.'s employees had no knowledge that the particular product 
possibly would be used here by the buyer. Therefore, the 
instant action actually provides a much stronger case for 
dismissal than that described in Philadelphia Resins. See 
also, Jones v. North American Aerodynamics Co., Inc., 594 
F.Supp. 657 (D.Maine 1984). 
The court in Philadelphia Resins also emphasized the 
importance of the cause of action arising from the defendant's 
conduct toward the forum. The court indicated "the instant 
cause of action arose, ultimately, from PRC's successful 
advertising efforts in Arkansas, together with the fortuitous 
transport of a PRC product into Utah; not from any effort PRC 
may have made to sell its products in Utah or to transport its 
product into Utah." Philadelphia Resins. 766 F.2d. at 446. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff's alleged injuries 
simply did not arise from the defendant's activities in Utah. 
Any injuries arose, ultimately, from a third party's 
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modification of a machine that originally had been sold for use 
in California. The machine's fortuitous transport to Utah was 
totally unrelated to IWM Co.'s nominal contacts with this state. 
The sole connecton between the defendant's activities 
in Utah and the machine that allegedly caused plaintiff's 
injury was the single visit here nine years ago by an IWM Co. 
service representative that looked, and only looked, at the 
machine. The representative did not perform service, 
maintenance or repairs on the machine and was not requested to 
do so by Weathershield. (R.19). The representative merely 
informed Weathershield that the machine had been modified by 
others since leaving IWM Co.'s plant and that these 
modifications were causing the problems with the machine. 
(R.19). In no possible sense can the plaintiff's injuries be 
construed as "arising out of" the service representative's 
visit and the plaintiff's complaint does not so allege. 
Contrary to plaintiff's implications, the representative had 
neither the duty, nor even the right, to work on the machine 
without a contract to do so with Weathershield. 
If the representative had performed service on the 
machine and the plaintiff was injured as a result of the 
representative's repairs, then perhaps the required nexus 
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries 
would be present. However, because the defendant did 
absolutely nothing concerning the machine other than inform 
Weathershield that modifications made on the machine were 
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causing a problem, there remains no connection between the 
plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's limited activities in 
this state. 
Therefore, the constitutionally mandated nexus between 
the plaintiff's claimed injuries and the defendant's contacts 
with Utah remains unsatisfied by the facts of this case. The 
due process requirements of the 14th Amendment mandate that Mr. 
Arguello's suit be dismissed. 
B. IWM Co. has not indirectly established 
minimum contacts with Utah by placing the 
finger joint machine into the stream of 
commerce. 
Plaintiff mischaracterizes this case as involving 
stream of commerce issues. Stream of commerce is a "term used 
to describe goods which remain in interstate commerce though 
held within a state for a short period of time. If such goods 
remain in the stream of commerce, they are not subject to local 
taxation." Black's Law Dictionary, 1921 (6th ed. 1990). The 
term implies the flow of goods through a distribution system 
between a manufacturer and the ultimate retail purchaser of the 
goods. As Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117, 
107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92, 107 (1987), "[t]he stream of 
commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies but to 
the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacturer 
to distribution to retail sale." 
In the instant action, the machine clearly was not 
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placed into the stream of commerce. It was sold and delivered 
directly to the intended user, Pickering Lumber Co., in 
California (R.18-19). The machine appears to have been custom 
made for Pickering and Pickering was charged sales tax, further 
indicating that Pickering was the intended user of the 
machine. (R.21-23). Similarly, IWM Co. generally sells all 
its products directly to the user rather than through any 
distribution network. (R.18). In short, there has been no 
regular or anticipated flow of IWM Co.'s products from 
manufacturer to distribution to retail sale in Utah. 
Accordingly, the use of the stream of commerce theory is an 
inappropriate basis to analyze this case. 
It is noteworthy that Mr. Arguello apparently concedes 
that the machine was manufactured and sold for use by Pickering 
Lumber Co. in California. (Appellants brief at 5). Mr. 
Arguello has not asserted that the machine originally was 
intended for resale by Pickering to Utah, nor would the 
evidence support such an assertion. 
Rather, Mr. Arguello argues that because the machine 
originally cost $85,000.00 it was foreseeable that the machine> 
eventually would be resold as used equipment in Utah. He 
apparently asserts that the foreseeability of the machined 
possible resale as used equipment provides for personal 
jurisdicton under a stream of commerce theory. Appellant's 
brief at 9. This premise totally lacks any foundation in 
evidence or logic and is contrary to controlling case law. 
-16-
Mr. Agruello failed to introduce any evidence in the 
proceedings below showing the existence of a secondary market 
or indicating that it was likely or even foreseeable that the 
machine would be resold in Utah. He also failed to show why an 
$85,000.00 finger jointing machine was likely to find its way 
into another state, particularly Utah, simply based on its 
cost. Logic would dictate that a custom built machine 
manufactured for use by a California lumber company likely 
would remain with the lumber company throughout the machine's 
useful life. 
Even assuming that it was foreseeable that the machine 
eventually could be sold as used equipment in another state, 
case law clearly has established that this type of 
foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient bench mark for 
personal jurisdiction under the due process clause. World-wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. at 296-97, 62 L.Ed.2d at 
500-01. The plaintiff's usage of "foreseeability" stretches 
its meaning to the point where all manufacturers would be 
amenable to suit wherever their products happened to go 
throughout the products' existence. The United States Supreme * 
Court has specifically rejected such a meaning of 
foreseeability as satisfying the due process requirements for 
personal jurisdiction. In World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, the court stated: 
If foreseeability were the criterion [for 
asserting personal jurisdiction], . . . every 
seller of chattels would in effect appoint the 
-17-
chattel his agent for service of process. His 
amenability to suit would travel with the 
chattel. We recently abandoned the outworn rule 
of Harris v. Balk, that the interest of a 
creditor in a debt could be extinguished or 
otherwise affected by any state having transitory 
jurisdiction over the debtor. Having interred 
the mechanical rule that a creditor's amenability 
to a quasi in rem action travels with his debtor, 
we are unwilling to endorse an analogous 
principle in the present case. . . . 
The foreseeability that is critical to due 
process analysis is not the mere likelihood that 
a product will find its way into the forum 
state. Rather, it is that the defendant's 
conduct and connection with the forum state are 
such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there. 
Id. (citations omitted). In the present case, Mr. Arguello's 
assertion that IWM Co.'s amenability to suit traveled with the 
finger jointing machine based on the machine's $85,000.00 cost 
obviously is contrary to the guidelines established above by 
the United States Supreme Court. 
It simply was not foreseeable, as that term applies in 
due process analysis, that the machine would end up in Utah 
subjecting IWM Co. to suit here. It was not foreseeable 
because IWM Co's conduct in selling the machine or in otherwise 
establishing connections with Utah were not such that IWM Co. 
should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court 
here. Accordingly, Mr. Arguello's stream of commerce theory 
has no basis in fact or law and is inappropriate to the present 
action. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that this case involved 
stream of commerce considerations, IWM Co. still would not be 
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subject to suit here under Utah law. In the recent case of 
Parry v. Ernst Home Center. 779 P.2d. 659 (Utah 1989), this 
court held that a Japanese manufacturer and a Japanese 
distributor of a maul that allegedly had caused injury to a 
Utah plaintiff were not subject to this state's personal 
jurisdiction. The maul originally was sold by a retailer in 
Idaho to a customer that had given it to her father in Utah. 
The Japanese defendants had dealt primarily with a California 
distributor, although they were informed of potential sales 
throughout the western United States. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that: 
[A]n intentional and knowing distribution of the 
product in the western United States is not 
necessarily sufficient to satisfy the "minimum 
contacts" requirement. . . . Without a showing of 
"additional conduct," we are unable to find that 
the eventual sale of a product in Utah justifies 
personal jurisdiction. 
Id. at 667. 
In the instant action, the case against asserting 
personal jurisdiction over IWM Co. is much stronger than 
existed in Parry because IWM Co. had no knowledge that its 
product might be resold and used in Utah. Therefore, even if a 
stream of commerce theory is applied to the facts of this case, 
controlling case law mandates that Utah may not exercise 
personal jurisdiction over IWM Co. because IWM Co. has not 
established sufficient minimum contacts wth this forum. The 
District Court's dismissal of Mr. Arguello's suit based on the 
-19-
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, accordingly, 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
IWM Co. has engaged in very few, insubstantial 
contacts with the State of Utah. Accordingly, Mr. Arguello's 
alleged injuries must arise from those contacts before a basis 
exists for this forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
IWM Co. under either Utah's long-arm statute or the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment. The alleged injuries, however, 
were caused by a machine that was built for and sold to a 
California lumber company by IWM Co. approximately 16 years 
prior to the time of Mr. Arguello's alleged mishap. IWM Co. 
participated in no activity that facilitated either the 
machine's fortuitous transport to Utah or Mr. Arguello's 
unfortunate mishap after the machine arrived here. Therefore, 
no legitimate basis exists to subject IWM Co. to the exercise 
of this state's personal jurisdiction and the ruling of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this l> c 
 jS day of May, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Douglas^ B. Thomas 
Attorneys for Appellee 
24 04 Washington Boulevard, 
Suite 900 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ARGUELLO, ) AFFIDAVIT OF GAIL Y. CROMEENS 
PLAINTIFF, 
V S
 • r * * 1X)f\ 
ftpfc -. P hi) 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING Civil No. 900900492P1 
MACHINE CO., INC., 
(Judge David E. Roth) 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
GAIL Y. CROMEENS, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Texas, am over the 
age of eighteen (18) and otherwise competent to make this 
affidavit. 
2. I am Executive Vice President of Industrial 
Woodworking Machine Co., Inc. ("the Company11) located in Garland, 
Texas. I have been employed at the company in the time periods 
between 1974 through 1980 and 1985 through the present. 
1 
3. I have thoroughly reviewed the company's records 
regarding the company's sales for the last nine years, including 
all sales made to customers in Utah during that time period. These 
records indicate that the company has had an average of $13,153.00 
sales to Utah customers in each of the last nine years, a figure 
that represents approximately three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) 
of the Company's total sale volume. 
4. The products sold to Utah during the last nine (9) 
years consist almost exclusively of parts, rather than eguipment 
or machinery. These parts were sold to Utah customers that 
telephoned in their orders to the Company's Texas location. On two 
occasions a Utah sales person contacted the Company to purchase a 
single chop saw (unrelated to a finger joint machine) that may have 
been for resale. These are the only two instances that I am aware 
of where the Company's products were purchased for resale in Utah 
and these instances did not occur through any initiative of the 
Company. 
5. I have also reviewed the Company's records 
concerning advertising and sales calls for the last three years. 
The Company has employed no sales people in Utah and no sales 
representatives have been sent to Utah during this time period. 
To my knowledge, the Company has never had a single employee that 
was located in Utah. Our records also show no contracts were 
written in Utah during the last three years. 
6. The Company has occasionally placed small 
advertisements in as many as four trade publications during the 
2 
last three years that may or may not have reached Utah. The 
advertisements have not dealt with finger joint machinery similar 
to the fingerjoint machine used by Weathershield. 
7. The company generally sells directly to customers 
who use our parts or machinery. I am unaware of sales to any 
entity that has been distributing or reselling our products to Utah 
customers. To my knowledge, the Company has never utilized a 
distribution network directed at Utah. The Company generally ships 
its products directly to its customers by common carrier. 
8. I have reviewed the Company's records concerning 
previous litigation and collection efforts. The Company has no 
record of any previous involvement in a court case in Utah or of 
utilizing Utah's services and resources for debt collection or 
other purposes. 
9. To my knowledge, my review of the Company's records 
is representative of the Company's contacts with Utah since the 
Company's inception. I am unaware of any time period when the 
Company's sales in Utah or contacts with Utah would have been 
either numerically or proportionately greater than the time period 
that I examined. 
10. I have examined the Company's records regarding the 
sale of fingerjoint machine, Model 3470, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-4-
10771. This machine was made for and sold to Pickering Lumber 
Company in Standard, California. The machine was shipped to 
Pickering on July 9, 1971, as indicated by the copy of the invoice 
3 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". I am unaware how the machine came 
into Weathershield's possession in Logan, Utah. 
Generally, the Company has not sent service personnel to 
perform maintenance or service on machinery in Utah. However, in 
July of 1982, Weathershield contacted the Company and requested it 
to send a service representative to examine certain machinery in 
Weathershield's possession in Utah that had been manufactured by 
the Company. One of the items examined was finger joint machine, 
Model 3470, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-4-10771, that Weathershield had 
somehow acquired. This machine had been substantially modified 
during the ten-year period since it had left the Company's 
possession. The service representative discovered that the biggest 
problem with the machine involved the back-up lugs coming out of 
square causing the wood to pop out. The machine had been modified 
to use Zeigelmeyer lugs rather than the lug system that the Company 
originally provided. The service representative advised 
Weathershield that the lug system needed to be reworked to hold 
squareness on before the machine would perform properly. The 
service representative did not perform any service or work on the 
machine and merely responded to Weathershield's inquiry concerning 
the operation of the machine. A copy of the service 
representative's report is attached as Exhibit "B". The 
highlighted portion deals with the fingerjoint machine. 
4 
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To my knowledge, during the last nine years this is the 
only occasion when the Company has sent a service representative 
to Utah. 
// day ofW^W!, DATED this /   fCATZ^t. 1990 
GAIL Y. tROMEENS 
^ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this //^ day of 
UM^J ' 1 9 9 ° * 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ <- y 
Residing at: XJAAJO^C/. /XA/A.*/ 
My Commission Expires: 
3'S- ?S 
?0 
MMtrs of Sp*UJ Nrp«M MOCMMTV" 
V0SDW0RKIN6 MACHINE CI . , I K . 
•WBH'URCHASE ORDER NO. 
INDUSTRIAL QUOTATION NO. & » | M | ( » « l " f f ) 0lM$ 
INDUSTRIAL LAYOUT DWG. NO. 
340 NORTH FIFTH STREET 
OftRLAJSD. DALLAS COUNTY. TEXAS 
Ttfc*ft. 6-0367 - P. O. BOX 1466 
SHIP TO: 
SHIP VIA: 
OAIE SSUED 
v»-n 
PAtT 01 MOOtt NO. 
Jr*m 
SBUAIMUMM $H#PINO DAT! 
JfeifeHEL. 
DATESN f^CD DAlf COMJtfTB 
7a*f/Tm£7«W*Xi 
H7OTtthM*HM»~ 
P. 
.dlMV Mtff*. 
UK 
r. 
i imt 
5VE THIS WORK ORDER AUTHORIZES MANUFACTURE" OF ABO  ITEMS 
fOtM #105 
CAfilANO, TEXAS 75040 
- AFTER QUANTITY INDICATES 
BACKOROERED PART CUSTOMER FILE COPY 
TO, 
ftttterd* fellftm* £375 
f/v r v ^ 
^l<|f'iii'iii*i,i"riii<Tii"wii'*r iV *~yr 
^ V 
.V- • •'?£• 
- AFTER QUANTITY INDICATES 
BACKORDERED PART CUSTOMER FILE COPY 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACHINE CO., INC 
f. O. BOX 1444 GARLAND, TEXAS 
SERVICE REPORT 
0 % jT 6~M76$~'/-10 7 7/ 
July 29 19 £2_ * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " 
« WEATHERSHIELD f_ Address Logan, Utah 
lines Serviced: 
cc Performed: 
7/20/82 - Left NICOLAI at Springfield, Oregon 2;45 PM, drove to JEugene._ _ 
Took plane to Salt Lake City, arriving at 8:00 PM^ Met^  by Bryan Jensen 
and Jeff Smith. Drove to Logan, Utah — arrived 11:30 PM. 
721/82 - In plant at 7:00 AM. 
__ Started checking ripsaw out — found several electrical parts on the switch 
console that were bad. Went over the principle of operation of the ripsaw 
__ __ and the function with Bryan and Jeff and the operator. 
Main problem seamed to be the electrical console, and synchronization not 
working on the edger in relation to the rip blades. Started trying to trouble 
shoot. Found a few sticky valves, and adjustment of new Servo that was 
installed. Replaced a Skinner valve that actuates the Servo system, and it 
did not work. Thought there might be another problem — could not find it — 
went back to the new valve that was installed, and found that the new valve 
was bad. Cleaned the old valve and replaced it — it worked a few times and 
then quit. Bryan said they would get another valve and install the next day. 
Suggested that they need to replace the switches on the console to get an 
effective operation. 
Met with Mike Anderson (over the finger jointing) and asked him wh?t kind of 
problems they might be encountering there. Said their b:i:gest problem was 
the back up lugs not staying square. These are Ziegelmeyer lugs, and he says 
they square them from one to two times a day — savs he can square them and 
only run about an hour. 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACHINE CO, INC 
f. O. BOX U 6 6 GARLAND, TEXAS 
SEBVICf REPOtT 
July 29 19 _82_ 
WEATHERSHIELD Address Logan, UT 
ics Serviced: 
Performed: (7/21/82- continued) 
Went over the alignment of the machinery. Explained to them that they need 
to get some lugs that they can hold squareness on. If they do not want to 
use ours, to rework Ziegelmeyers where they can hold them square. 
They were running a slower feed on their 3550 due to lumber not being square, 
because of back up lugs. _Also_catting short lengths due to this same problem. 
Explained to them that if they would correct this, they could speed__the machine 
up. Mike says that they can feed the_nachine faster, but they slow it down due 
to the pop out problems caused by the out of scucre joints. Ihey said that 
thev would correct this. 
*They questioned me about running 3/4 x 1-1/4 material on the assembly machine. 
Said that when they tried to run this it was drooping down in the saw carriage 
area, and also popping out in the squeeze. Explained to them how to set the 
squeeze anvils, and that the glue would need to have some tack to it, and 
get a good pre-squeeze in the roil section to run this, 
Talked with John White, plant manager. Explained to him what we had done, and 
suggested that they need to spend the money on the ripsaw switch gangs to 
correct the main problems they were naving out there, 
The people 1 worked with at Weathershield were: 
Bryan Jensen - Maintenance Supervisor 
Jeff Smith - Cut, rip and yard foreman 
Mike Anderson - finger joint lead man 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACH^f CO., INC 
f. O. BOX 14** GARIANO, TEXAS 
SERVICE REPORT 
!• Jvly 29, 19 J2_ 
me WEATHERSHIELD Address Logan, UT 
ichinet Serviced: 
vice Performed: (7/21/82 - continued) 
nppprted for Salt Lake Citv. Arrived .Salt_Lake City at _6l30._ Could not 
get a f l ight out of Salt Lake City until 10:00. Departed Salt Lake City 
at 10:00. arrived in Dallas at 6:15 Thursday morning. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellee to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, this 15th day of May, 1991, to the following: 
James R. Hasenyager 
and Martin W. Custen 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
2661 Washington Blvd., #202 
Ogden, UT 84401 B
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